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Abstract 
Based on the GEM listed companies in 2009-2016, the authors discuss the impact of government-enterprise cooperation 
on enterprise technology innovation and its actual economic consequences from the two dimensions of R&D investment 
and corporate performance. The empirical results of this paper are as follows: the government-enterprise cooperation 
model does not promote enterprises to invest more funds for technological innovation, but it has a positive effect on 
corporate performance. The conclusion of this paper provides a new perspective and empirical evidence for us to 
understand the nature of government-enterprise cooperation and its impact on the entire economic market. It has strong 
theoretical and practical significance. 
Keywords: government-enterprise cooperation, technology innovation, corporate performance  
1. Introduction 
Due to the rapid changes in innovation technology, the quasi-publicity of industrial common technologies, and the 
enrichment of supply chain choices, the boundaries of the modern enterprises have become increasingly blurred. 
Enterprises and enterprises, universities and enterprises, governments and enterprises all have more Opportunity to 
cooperate. In recent years, with the support of national policies, the cooperation between Chinese government and 
enterprises tend to be more in-depth and extensive. At the 2016 National Science and Technology Innovation Conference, 
General Secretary Xi Jinping's proposal to support the National Technology Innovation Center based on enterprise 
construction once again focused everyone's attention on government-enterprise cooperation and technological innovation. 
At present, China is at the critical stage of the transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry. To realize the 
transformation from a manufacturing power to a manufacturing power at an early date, how the government can better 
guide the innovation strategic alliance and optimize the cooperation mode to enhance the technological innovation 
capability of Chinese enterprises has become an urgent problem for the country. Therefore, theoretically exploring the 
survival status of government-enterprise cooperation enterprises can not only provide theoretical guidance for Chinese 
enterprises to fully understand their own situation, recognize their own needs and development direction, but also help us 
to correctly evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of such cooperation. And recognize the government's positioning 
in the economic market, and then provide useful reference for the country in formulating corresponding economic policies, 
tax policies, environmental policies, laws and regulations. Why is this problem important? 
At the macro level, the central government, which represents the highest interests of China as a whole, encourages and 
guides enterprises to carry out technological innovation through policy orientation and establishment of technological 
innovation centers, which has enabled many enterprises to cooperate with the government; at the micro level, Can the 
expected model of government-enterprise cooperation really promote technological innovation in enterprises? At the same 
time, what is the state of business and profitability of government-enterprise cooperation? Since the cooperation between 
government and enterprises and the development of government-enterprise alliances are not long, scholars' research on 
such partnerships focuses on building models, analyzing concept definitions, and organizational differences while there 
is not much research on the innovation ability and competitiveness of government-enterprise cooperative enterprises with 
Chinese characteristics. There is also great controversy among existing research scholars. 
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Regarding the effect of government-enterprise cooperation, one view is that cooperation between the government and 
enterprises has a positive effect on the R&D and innovation of enterprises. Zhu Pingfang et al. (2003) studied the impact 
of the introduction of science and technology incentives on technological innovation within enterprises from the 
perspective of the government. Liu Xiaoyuan (2013) starts from the dual perspectives of technology innovation resource 
allocation and innovation output, and empirically studies local governments to promote technological innovation of 
startup enterprises through subsidies and income tax benefits. Wang Yebin (2013) analyzes the research on government 
investment and financial credit, and finds that the influence of government behavior on enterprise technology innovation 
is significant in the financial aspect. In 2012, ZanderI analyzed from two regional and international macro levels, and 
believed that the role of the government in the alliance is not only domestically effective. In promoting the process of 
internationalization and innovation, it also attracts foreign investment by optimizing the domestic innovation environment. 
The effect of entering the market. Long Jing et al. (2012) believe that government agencies have their own unique power 
resources to actively play on SMEs, enhance the relationship between government and enterprises, and have a positive 
impact on the technological innovation of SMEs. From the study of the role of government in innovation, LucaLMD 
(2007) believes that the government's role in innovation is mainly reflected in policy support, policy guidance and policy 
support. Guo Jing, Chen Yongqi and other scholars (2013) study that the government acts on enterprises through policy 
orientation. Compared with market orientation, enterprise technology innovation performance is more influenced by 
market orientation. When policy orientation and market orientation are balanced on enterprises, The positive impact of 
innovation is most significant . Sun Demei et al. (2014) concluded that government behavior and financial development 
play a positive role in innovation performance, while the research on the role of financial development needs to be 
sustained and postponed, and it needs lag data to show its role. When the premise adjustment is changed to a dynamic 
environment, the positive effect of government behavior on innovation performance is as lagging as financial 
development. Xiao Liping (2016) quantifies the behavior of government-enterprise contact into data through the target 
design function, and constructs a decision-making model that reflects the technological innovation of the enterprise. When 
the local government intervention increases, it is positively promoting the innovation between schools and enterprises. 
Output. Zhou Qiongqiong and Hua Qingsong (2015) found through research that the government played a role in the 
allocation of science and technology resources, which indirectly made the company's technological innovation capability 
more prominent and achieved better results. 
However, another view is that the government is counterproductive or incosistent to the company's innovative behavior. 
Yang Ruoyu (2016) obtained empirical analysis that local protection has a negative effect on regional innovation 
performance. Bai Chongen et al. (2015) found that if there is local protection in the region, it can be inferred that the local 
government's tax rate policy is generally high, and the regional enterprises are also highly nationalized. There are also 
many scholars who study the impact of government action on enterprises from the perspective of policy guidance and 
financial support. Fan Qi et al. (2011) empirically found that in China, enterprise independent innovation and government 
innovation R&D investment policies have complementary relationships, but when the market competition level exceeds 
the critical value of the inverted U-shaped top, the promotion effect of government innovation R&D investment policy 
sharply declines. Gu Yuanyuan and Shen Kunrong (2012) believe that the relationship between the government and the 
enterprise is related to the social environment. When the environment of the enterprise gets worse, the government 
intervenes in the enterprise tend to be more, resulting in the lower the independent control of the enterprise. Xiao Wen 
(2014) found that the government's long-term goal in the market conflicts with the pursuit of short-term goals, and that 
there is a mismatch between corporate sales and R&D management, resulting in a negative correlation between 
government behavior and corporate technology innovation efficiency. Luo Mingxin (2013) used data analysis of China's 
GEM listed companies and found that political connections have a negative effect on technological innovation 
performance through the intermediary role of R&D investment. Zhou Qiongqiong, Yuan Lijing (2017) found that there is 
a “U-shaped” relationship between environmental regulation and enterprise technology innovation. Appropriate use of 
government subsidy behavior in the negative stage of the “U-shaped” process can promote the development of 
technological innovation in enterprises. 
Based on the existing research, this paper takes the companies listed on China Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), from 
the two dimensions of the status quo and development, empirically tests the series of influences of the government's 
participation in the technological innovation of the alliance and its economic consequences. It not only evaluates the 
current and sustainable development of the formation of government-enterprise alliances from the micro level, but also 
provides theoretical and practical basis for the formulation and reform of relevant policies, which has important 
implications for understanding the role of government and enterprise cooperation in China's economic development, 
improving national innovation system and formulating industrial policies. 
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2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypotheses 
2.1 Definition of the Concept of Government-Enterprise Cooperation 
The government-enterprise cooperation discussed in this paper is defined as the government-enterprise relationship in 
which the government and enterprises have publicly issued cooperation statements in public platforms such as newspapers, 
websites, press conferences, and media. The cooperation between government and enterprises here can be equated with 
the concept of government-enterprise alliance, that is, the cooperation mode between government and enterprises for 
resource sharing, information exchange and risk sharing due to a certain project or common goal. In addition, the 
government-enterprise cooperation referred to in this article does not necessarily refer to state-owned enterprises, nor 
does it only refer to enterprises that accept government subsidies, and it must be based on the public release statement, 
which is also a prerequisite for the empirical data collection. 
2.2 Proposal of Research Hypotheses 
In modern times, American management scientist R. Nigel and DEC president J. Hopland both proposed the concept of 
"strategic alliance" for the first time in the history of management. With the development of China's reform and opening-
up, driven by countries with rapid economic development such as Japan and the United States, enterprise-enterprise 
cooperation model, industry-university-research cooperation model, and government-enterprise cooperation model also 
have begun to emerge in our country. In 2008, the Chinese government issued the “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the 
Construction of Strategic Alliances for Industrial Technology Innovation”, which further promoted the cooperation 
between the government and enterprises. By June 2012, when the Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology issued 
the “Economic Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance Evaluation Work Plan, the cooperation between government 
and enterprises has become one of the mainstreams of the cooperation model. “Notice of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology on Printing and Distributing the Guidelines for the Construction of National Technology Innovation Centers” 
promulgated in 2017 clearly clarifies that the direction of “supporting the construction of national technology innovation 
centers based on enterprises” proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping needs to be fully implemented and will establish 
a technology innovation center to play a role. Based on the above-mentioned environment created by the Chinese 
government, the government-enterprise cooperation has a very reasonable formation motivation and motivation support, 
and it can also obtain the government's allocated innovation funds. At the same time, government-enterprise cooperation 
is also a form of political alliance, which enables members to share resources and improve the ability of innovative 
resources to use (Xiangjie Zheng,2014). Based on the internal government and business managers, government officials 
have won higher promotion opportunities for themselves. To achieve their political goals and social tasks, they have 
cooperated with large-scale and high-quality enterprises to fulfill their political demands (Yuanyuan Gu & Kunrong 
Shen,2012). And companies also want to get government-specific public and administrative resources. The alliance 
between the government and enterprises not only involves the cooperation needs in the macro environment, but also the 
needs of deep levels and their own interests. Under such a complex multi-demand model, what impact will it have on the 
current state of the enterprise and sustainable development? The author hopes to comprehensively evaluate the enterprise 
by analyzing the technical innovation of the government-enterprise cooperation enterprise and the current situation of the 
business operation. Technological innovation represents the possibility that enterprises will grasp more core 
competitiveness in the future, and is an indicator for enterprise upgrading and sustainable development. The current state 
of business management is the most intuitive description of the current state of the enterprise, and it is a possibility to 
evaluate whether the enterprise can carry out technological innovation. According to the research and analysis of most 
scholars (Bing Li, Yunqi Yue & Ting Chen,2016), for technological innovation, we select the R&D data of the enterprise 
for analysis, while for the current state of business, we choose the performance of the enterprise to measure. Therefore, 
this paper proposes the following assumptions: 
Hypothesis 1-a: If the other things remain unchanged, government-enterprise cooperation is positively related to corporate 
R&D investment (R&D) under other conditions. 
Hypothesis 1-b: If the other things remain unchanged, government-enterprise cooperation is negatively related to 
corporate R&D investment (R&D). 
Hypothesis 2-a: If the other things remain unchanged, government-enterprise cooperation is positively related to corporate 
performance. 
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3. Study Design 
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
The GEM is a “second board market” in the Chinese stock market. Entrepreneurial companies, high-tech enterprises, 
small and medium-sized enterprises that have not yet entered the main board market have become the main enterprises 
of the GEM. In the past ten years, China's economy has developed rapidly and its forms of enterprises are diverse. The 
GEM market provides a high-quality competitive platform for small and medium-sized enterprises to finance and innovate 
technology. In October 2009, the China GEM was officially launched in the stock market, providing continuous, 
comprehensive and reliable empirical data for the research and discussion of economics on small and medium-sized 
enterprises and high-tech innovative enterprises. The author is also based on this point, and will explore the empirical 
data of government-enterprise cooperative enterprises as the research object. 
The financial data required for the empirical sample of this paper was selected from the China Taian Database (CSMAR), 
the annual reports of various enterprises and the enterprise portal website. The time period was selected from the data of 
the GEM listed companies during 2009-2016. Since the definition of enterprise alliance needs special division, and there 
is no clear classification in the data, the author manually sorts, extracts, and sorts out the target data required by this article 
from the annual report of the enterprise. After eliminating the missing and suspicious data, a total of 6,774 observation 
samples were obtained in this paper. 
3.2 Model Specification and Variable Definition  
To test hypothesis 1-a, 1-b. We establish the following regression models, models (1)-(3). According to the relevant 
literatures of scholars such as Gu Yuanyuan, Shen Kunrong (2012), Chen Yu (2016), Xiao Liping (2016), this paper will 
focus on the R&D investment data of government-enterprise cooperative enterprises (interpreted variables). It is measured 
by three joint indicators: R&D/total assets, R&D/10,000 yuan, and ln (R&D +1).  the explanatory variable is whether it 
is a government-enterprise cooperative enterprise, and the enterprise belonging to the government-enterprise alliance 
cooperation category is recorded as “1”, and vice versa as “0”. In the selection of control variables, referring to the relevant 
researches in the previous literature, we select the six comprehensive indicators of enterprise size, asset-liability ratio, 
gross profit margin, total return on assets, growth rate of operating income, and shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder. 
          (1) 
     (2) 
     (3) 
To test hypotheses 2-a, 2-b, we propose the following regression model, models (4)-(5). According to Deng Xinghua, Lin 
Zhouyi (2014), Zhang Rui (2014), Li Mengyang, Guo Chaoyang (2017) and other related literature, this paper will use 
revenue and Tobin Q to measure the performance of the company (the explanatory variable). These four indicators are 
also key statistics reflecting the business status of the company. The explanatory variable is still whether it is a 
government-enterprise cooperative enterprise. Enterprises belonging to the government-enterprise alliance cooperation 
category are recorded as “1”, and vice versa as “0”. In terms of control variables, referring to the relevant research in the 
previous literature, we select firm size, asset-liability ratio, firm life cycle, firm ' s cash flow, executive pay, proportion of 
the largest shareholder, ultimate holder, CEO duality, industry, year, these ten comprehensive indicators. 
                 (4) 




098765432101  ++++++++++= IndustryYearLevFirststockSizeSmGrowRoAPtRd
198765432102  ++++++++++= IndustryYearLevFirststockSizeSmGrowRoAPtRd
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Table 1. Variables definition 





Rd1 Rd1= R&D expenditures/total assets at year-end 
Rd2 Rd2= R&D expenditures /10000 
Rd3 Rd3=ln（R&D expenditures +1） 
Performance 
Revenue 
Revenue= main business income + other business 
income 
TobinsQ 
TobinsQ=（market value of ordinary shares at year-








Dummy variable. If government cooperate with the 
enterprise, the value is 1; otherwise, the value is 0 
control variable 
   
Return on assets ROA ROA= net profit/ average total assets 
Main business revenue 
growth rate 
Grow Grow=（main business income of this year－main 
business income of last year）／main business 
income of last year *100% 
Sales margin Sm Sm=（main business income－main  business cost）
／main business income *100% 
Firm size Size Size= ln(total assets at year-end) 
Proportion of the 
largest shareholder 
Firststock The propotion of the largest shareholder’s 
shareholding in the companies 
Asset-liability ratio Lev Lev= total liabilities at year-end / total assets at year-
end *100% 
Year effect Year 
We define seven dummy variables, for which the 
benchmark year is 2009 
Industry effect Industry 
Dumb variables, according to the "Guidelines for 
Listed Companies' Industry Classification", the listed 
companies are divided into 12 industry categories 
(excluding financial industries), and 11 industry 
dummy variables are set. If the listed company is a 
reference system, take 1; otherwise take 0. 
Firm life cycle Age 
The survival time of the firm from the beginning to 
this year 
Firm cash flow  Cashflow 
Cashflow= operating income of this year - cash cost - 
income tax 
Executive pay Pay 
The compensation level of executives in the target 
enterprise 
Ultimate holder Ulitimatecontrol 
dummy variable equal to 1 for a state-owned 
enterprise and 0 otherwise 
CEO duality Dual 
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4. Empirical Result 
4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Table 2. Government-enterprise cooperative enterprise 
Pt 0 1 
  
 
number percentage number percentage Total 
Year 
     
2009 19 76.00% 6 24.00% 25 
2010 70 72.16% 27 27.84% 97 
2011 131 74.43% 45 25.57% 176 
2012 166 74.77% 56 25.23% 222 
2013 166 74.77% 56 25.23% 222 
2014 191 76.71% 58 23.29% 249 
2015 217 77.78% 62 22.22% 279 
2016 225 77.85% 64 22.15% 289 
According to Table 2, from the perspective of absolute number and relative number, we can find that in 2009-2016, more 
than 20% of enterprises have cooperated with the government (Pt=1). It shows that in recent years, government-enterprise 
cooperation has been widely applied in China. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Min Median 
 
Max Mean SD 
Rd1 6774 0 0.0333 0.393 0.0446 0.0395 
Rd2 6774 0 2999 185956 5157 7570 
Rd3 6774 0 17.22 21.34 17.19 1.712 
Revenue 6774 7.790e+07 4.470e+08 4.130e+10 7.410e+08 1.150e+09 
Sm 6774 -12.17 39.46 96.83 42.51 17.84 
ROA 6774 -46.84 6.452 37.25 6.637 5.900 
TobinsQ 6419 0.603 3.231 24.94 3.853 2.625 
Pt 6774 0 0 1 0.0552 0.228 
Size 6774 19.56 20.94 24.20 21.04 0.698 
Lev 6774 0.0110 0.198 0.843 0.232 0.150 
Age 6774 4 13 30 13.03 4.166 
Firststock 6774 0.0438 0.291 0.812 0.309 0.123 
Grow 6774 -79.09 21.22 557.0 27.44 43.35 
Cashflow 6774 -1.481 0.0410 1.030 0.0498 0.135 
Pay 6763 124000 1.278e+06 9.595e+06 1.473e+06 978735 
 Ultimateconontrol 6774 0 0 1 0.0309 0.173 
Dual 6749 0 0 1 0.451 0.498 
According to Table 3, it can be statistically concluded that the median of 0.033 of Rd1 (R&D /total assets) is very close 
to the average of 0.0446, while the standard deviation is 0.0395. The median 17.22 of Rd3 (Ln (R&D +1)) is very close 
to the average 17.19, while the standard deviation is 1.712. It shows that the dispersion of samples of Rd1 (R&D/total 
assets) and Rd3 (Ln (R&D +1)) is not high. Compared with Rd1 (R&D/total assets) and Rd3 (Ln (R&D +1)), the degree 
of dispersion of Rd2 (R&D /10000) is relatively high. From the data of size (firm size), the scale of enterprises in 
government-enterprise cooperation is not much different. Lev (asset-liability ratio) has a maximum value of 0.843, a 
minimum of 0.0110, and an average of 0.232, indicating that most of the government-enterprise cooperation Lev (asset-
liability ratio) is below the median. The situation of Firststock (proportion of the largest shareholder) is like that of Lev 
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(asset-liability ratio). Although the median of ROA (Return on assets) is close to the average, the span between minimum and 
maximum is relatively large, and the standard deviation also reaches 5.900, indicating that the Return on total assets of different 
government-enterprise cooperatives is not stable. The minimum value of Grow (main business revenue growth rate) reached -
79.09, indicating that the risk of R&D investment is large, which is in line with the development of real enterprise R&D 
investment. The differences between maximum value and minimum value of Sm (sales margin) and ROA (return on assets) are 
both large, and the data spans of them are both between positive and negative, indicating that the profit and gross profit of the 
government-enterprise cooperative enterprise also has a loss when it is profitable. 
On the other hand, it can be statistically concluded that the minimum value of Revenue (operating income) is 7.790e+07, 
and the maximum value is 4.130e+10, indicating the disparity in income between enterprises in government-enterprise 
cooperation. The maximum value of TobinsQ (Tobin Q value) is 24.94, the minimum value is 0.603, and the standard 
deviation is 2.625, indicating that most of the enterprises that cooperate with government are concentrated near the median 
TobinsQ. Age (firm life cycle) is mostly concentrated in the age of enterprises for more than ten years，during which China's 
economy develops rapidly and the government begins to increase business cooperation. From the data of Size (frim size), 
we can find that the scale of government-enterprise cooperative enterprises doesn’t appear to be much different. 
4.2 Correlation Analysis  
Table 4. Correlation statistics of major variables 
Variable Rd1 Rd2 Rd3 Revenue TobinsQ 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
Pt -0.078*** -0.014 -0.078*** 0.101*** -0.051*** 
ROA 0.291*** 0.094*** 0.017 - - 
Sm 0.326*** 0.049*** 0.070*** - - 
Size -0.068*** 0.538*** 0.286*** 0.593*** -0.152*** 
Lev -0.151*** 0.194*** 0.114*** 0.350*** -0.086*** 
Age - - - 0.103*** 0.100*** 
Firststock -0.144*** -0.106*** -0.138*** -0.015 0.034*** 
Grow 0.175*** 0.141*** 0.065*** 0.201*** 0.103*** 
Cashflow - - - -0.007 0.240*** 
Pay - - - 0.366*** 0.057*** 
Ultimateconontrol - - - -0.013 0.032*** 
Dual - - - -0.018 0.029** 
      
Note：* Statistical significance at the 10% level，** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level 
In Table 4, the correlation between the main variables and the control variables of Hypothesis 1 and 2 in this paper is 
analyzed. For hypothesis 1, we can find that Rd1, Rd3 are both in a significant negative correlation with Pt (government-
enterprise cooperation) at the 1% level while Rd2 and Pt (government-enterprise cooperation) are not significantly 
negatively correlated, and their relationship is not clear. For this item, we will continue to discuss their relevance in the 
following regression analysis. Compared with Rd2 and Rd3, the negative correlation between Rd1 and other control 
variables is more significant. It has a negative correlation with Size (firm size), Lev (asset-liability ratio) and Firststock 
(proportion of the largest shareholder). Moreover, Sm (sale margin) is positively correlated with Rd2, Rd3 and Rd1. The 
corresponding correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level.  
For Hypothesis 2, as shown in Table 4, Revenue (operating income), TobinsQ (Tobin Q value) are both in a significant 
negative correlation with Pt (government-enterprise cooperation) at the 1% level. Among the control variables, Size 
(enterprise size), Age (firm life cycle), Lev (a asset-liability ratio), Pay (executive pay) are all significantly related to 
Revenue (operating income) at the level of 1% while Cashflow(firm cash flow) Firststock (proportion of the largest 
shareholder), Ultimatecontrol (ultimate holder), Dual (CEO duality) have no significant relation with Revenue (operating 
income). But The second dependent variable TobinsQ (Tobin Q value) is significantly correlated with all selected control 
variables. 
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4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
4.3.1 Government-Enterprise Cooperation and R&D Input 
Table 5. Regression result for government -enterprise cooperation and R&D input (Rd1) 
Rd1 Coef. t P>|t| 
Pt -0.00755*** -4.06 0.000 
ROA 0.000959*** 11.71 0.000 
Sm 0.000325*** 11.83 0.000 
Size -0.00296*** -4.30 0.000 
Lev 0.0192*** 5.52 0.000 
Firststock -0.0280*** -8.35 0.000 
Grow 8.98e-05*** 8.91 0.000 







Note：* Statistical significance at the 10% level，** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level 
Table 5 examines the impact of government-enterprise cooperation on corporate R&D investment. The variable Rd1 
(R&D expenditures/total assets at year-end) representing R&D investment has a significant negative correlation with 
whether the government and enterprises cooperate (Pt). The regression coefficient is -0.00755 and is significant at the 1% 
level, which verifies the hypothesis 1-b that we proposed before. That is, if other conditions remain unchanged, 
government-enterprise cooperation has a negative correlation with the investment in R&D of enterprises. 
The regression results also show that the government-enterprise cooperation model cannot promote enterprise technology 
innovation. It can be seen from the China National Yearbook that the government's investment in science and technology 
innovation has increased year by year, but the actual regression data shows that the effect is not satisfactory. The 
government should reformulate new investment policies and expand the scope of enterprises. 
In terms of different control variables, the results are like the previous correlation analysis. The regression coefficients of 
Firststock (proportion of the largest shareholder）is negative and is significant at the level of 10%. Besides, Size (firm 
size) is negatively correlated with Rd1 (R&D expenditures/total assets at year-end) and is also significant at the level of 
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Table 6. Robustness test for government -enterprise cooperation and R&D input (Rd2) 
Rd2 Coef. t P>|t| 
Pt -1,461*** -4.23 0.000 
ROA 92.32*** 6.09 0.000 
Sm 16.17*** 3.18 0.001 
Size 6,113*** 47.85 0.000 
Lev 2,766*** 4.29 0.000 
Firststock 1,295** 2.08 0.038 
Grow -5.163*** -2.76 0.006 







Note：* Statistical significance at the 10% level，** Statistical significance at the 5% level，*** 
Statistical significance at the 1% level 
Table 7. Robustness test for government -enterprise cooperation and R&D input (Rd3) 
Rd3 Coef. t P>|t| 
Pt -0.194*** -2.94 0.003 
ROA 0.00319 1.10 0.273 
Sm 0.00922*** 9.44 0.000 
Size 0.914*** 37.31 0.000 
Lev 0.196 1.59 0.113 
Firststock -0.601*** -5.04 0.000 
Grow -0.000990*** -2.76 0.006 
Cons -163.9*** -4.93 0.000 
Industry Control 
Year Control 




Note：* Statistical significance at the 10% level，** Statistical significance at the 5% level，*** 
Statistical significance at the 1% level 
To further verify the reliability of the empirical results, we conduct a robustness test. we use Rd2(R&D expenditures 
/10000) and Rd3=ln (R&D expenditures+1) to replace Rd1 (R&D expenditures/total assets at year-end) for regression. 
From the results of the robustness test in Tables 6 and 7, the two variables representing the R&D investment, Rd2 and 
Rd3, have significant negative relation with whether the government and enterprises cooperate (Pt). The regression 
coefficients are -1,461 and -0.194 respectively and are both significant under the level of 1%, which is consistent with the 
regression result using variable Rd1. In terms of different control variables, the results are like the previous correlation 
analysis. Sm (sale margin) is both significantly positively related with Rd2, Rd3 at the level of 1%. 
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From the above, the robustness test results are still consistent with the hypothesis 1-b, which further supports the inference 
of the hypothesis 1-b in this paper. 
4.3.2 Government-Enterprise Cooperation and Corporate Performance 
From the results of the multiple regression analysis in Table 8, Revenue (operating income) used to describe corporate 
performance and government-enterprise cooperation (Pt) show a significant positive correlation, with a regression 
coefficient of 179,000,000, which is significant at the level of 1%. It means that the cooperation between government and 
enterprises has improved the performance of such enterprises and has a positive impact on their operating income. 
Meanwhile, the R-square of this regression is 40.3%, which indicate that the regression fit is good. The hypothesis 2-a 
proposed before is verified. That is, If the other things remain unchanged, government-enterprise cooperation is positively 
related to corporate performance. 
In terms of control variables, we control the year effect (Year) and the industry effect (Industry). They have no positive 
or negative correlation with the performance of the government-enterprise cooperative corporate, indicating that the 
company's performance will be affected by the policies, the economic environment and other specific conditions of the 
year. Size (firm size) and Revenue (operating income) are significant at the level of 1%, indicating that the larger the size 
of the government-enterprise cooperative firm, the greater the company's operating income. Age (firm life cycle) has no 
obvious correlation with Revenue (operating income) from the regression coefficient, indicating that the company's 
survival years has no relevant impact on corporate performance；seniority does not necessarily represent high performance，
instead，if new enterprises catch market demand, they can also create high performance. The impact factor of Pay 
(executive pay) on Revenue (operating income) is 193.0, which is significantly greater than 0 at the 1% level. It can be 
judged that the salary level of senior executives in the enterprise has obvious incentive effect on the performance of the 
company, which confirms the theory of agency theory. To further improve their salary level, corporate executives will pay 
more attention to the project and business content contributing to corporate performance. On the contrary, because of the 
uncertainty of technological innovation, high technical requirements, R&D cycle plants, large investment in research and 
development, and long investment time, the government-enterprise cooperative enterprises are not enthusiastic about 
R&D investment. Firststock (proportion of the largest shareholder) and Revenue (operating income) show a significant 
positive correlation at the 1% level, reflecting that when the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder is high, the 
shareholder's supervision of the manager is more effective. Therefore, the interests of the shareholders and the manager 
are more likely to reach an agreement, which makes the internal development of the enterprise more consistent and more 
constructive for the improvement of enterprise performance. 
Table 8. Regression result for government -enterprise cooperation and performance (Revenue) 
Revenue Coef. t P>|t| 
Pt 1.790e+08*** 3.48 0.000 
Size 8.229e+08*** 41.01 0.000 
Lev 1.311e+09*** 14.97 0.000 
Age 3.020e+06 1.04 0.299 
Cashflow 4.859e+07 0.56 0.575 
Pay 193.0*** 15.27 0.000 
Firststock 8.915e+08*** 9.35 0.000 
Ultimatecontrol -2.254e+08*** -3.49 0.000 
Dual 1.770e+07 0.77 0.443 
Cons 4.38E+10 1.63 0.103 
Industry Control 
Year Control 




Note：* Statistical significance at the 10% level，** Statistical significance at the 5% level，*** 
Statistical significance at the 1% level 
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To further verify the reliability of the empirical results, we conduct a robustness test. We use TobinsQ (Tobin Q value), a 
variable that reflects corporate performance to replace Revenue (operating income) for regression. The regression results 
are shown in Table 9. TobinsQ (Tobin Q value) and government-enterprise cooperation (Pt) showed a significant positive 
correlation with a regression coefficient of 0.286, which is significantly greater than 0 at the 5% level. This means that 
the cooperation between government and enterprises has improved the corporate performance of such enterprises and has 
a positive impact on Tobin's Q value. At the same time, the R-squar value of this regression is 36.1%, which proves that 
the regression has a good fit. The hypothesis 2-a proposed in this paper is further verified, which shows that the conclusion 
of this paper has higher stability. 
Table 9. Robustness test for government -enterprise cooperation and performance (TobinsQ) 
TobinsQ Coef. t P>|t| 
Pt 0.286** 2.31 0.021 
Size -1.198*** -24.59 0.000 
Lev -1.534*** -7.21 0.000 
Age -0.0101 -1.42 0.155 
Cashflow 3.249*** 15.78 0.000 
Pay 1.93e-07*** 6.23 0.000 
Firststock 1.154*** 5.01 0.000 
Ultimatecontrol 0.943*** 6.15 0.000 
Dual 0.112** 2.00 0.045 
Cons -137.0** -2.14 0.032 
Industry Control 
Year Control 
N  6,394 
 F-statistics 163.45 
Prob 0.0000 
Adj-R2 0.361 
Note：* Statistical significance at the 10% level，** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level 
5. Conclusions and Suggestions 
This paper takes the government-enterprise cooperation enterprise as the entry point. Through the empirical analysis of 
the financial data of the GEM listed companies in 2009-2016, under the dual perspectives of technological innovation 
and corporate performance, we discuss the impact of government-enterprise cooperation on the development and survival 
of enterprises. The study finds that government-enterprise cooperation has a good side for enterprises. With the 
cooperation, the company's performance tends to be better. government-enterprise cooperation has a positive effect on 
corporate performance. However, the cooperation between government and enterprises has inhibited the technological 
innovation of enterprises to a certain extent. Under the situation that the environment attaches great importance to 
technological innovation and the amount of government R&D investment is increasing year by year, compared with non-
government-enterprise alliances, enterprises that engage in government-enterprise cooperation have invested less in 
technology innovation and have not achieved substantial and sound development.  
Based on the above research conclusions, we propose the following suggestions: 
(1) When government and enterprises cooperate, they need to pay attention to the relationship between the government 
and the market, clarify the cooperation subjectivity of the enterprise, and emphasize the role of market leading. The 
cooperation between government and enterprises shows their particularity under the special national conditions of our 
country. The roles of the government and enterprises are not equal. The government is excessively offside, and financial 
subsidies inhibit innovation and development of enterprises. At the China 19th National Congress of the communist party 
in 2018, the new government made a core statement on the transformation of China's main contradictions, from "material 
and cultural needs" to "good life needs." In the direction of "material culture", the government can use the particularity 
of its role to do all the coordination and guidance. However, at a higher level of demand, the direction pursued by the 
whole society has changed, the development of economic diversification has become more prominent, and the defects of 
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the government's leading role have become increasingly apparent. The government should do a good job in coordinating 
economic development under a good and stable social environment, such as the cultivation of talents, the establishment 
of research institutes, etc., to clarify the main position of the company itself in the economic market, and respect the 
market’s survival of the fittest and the Guided renting of supply and demand relations. 
(2) The government needs to truly put the government-enterprise cooperation enterprises into the market and compete 
fairly with other enterprises. To prove that its governance and management are effective, the government will selectively 
cooperate with enterprises with good industrial resources and good business performance, and better promote local GDP 
under its guidance. At the same time, government officials have certain promotion criteria for their promotion. To achieve 
their political goals and social tasks, they cooperate with large-scale and high-quality enterprises to fulfill their political 
demands (Yuanyuan Gu & Kunrong Shen,2012). Therefore, the enterprises that cooperate with the government have not 
been tested by the market and the co This paper takes the government-enterprise cooperation enterprise as the entry point. 
Through the empirical analysis of the financial data of the GEM listed companies in 2009-2016, under the dual 
perspectives of technological innovation and corporate performance, we discuss the impact of government-enterprise 
cooperation on the development and survival of enterprises. The study finds that government-enterprise cooperation has 
a good side for enterprises. With the cooperation, the company's performance tends to be better. government-enterprise 
cooperation has a positive effect on corporate performance. However, the cooperation between government and 
enterprises has inhibited the technological innovation of enterprises to a certain extent. Under the situation that the 
environment attaches great importance to technological innovation and the amount of government R&D investment is 
increasing year by year, compared with non-government-enterprise alliances, enterprises that engage in government-
enterprise cooperation have invested less in technology innovation and have not achieved substantial and sound 
development.  
(3) Government-enterprise cooperative enterprises need to reconsider the importance of technological innovation. The 
positioning of the enterprise itself is very important. Due to the long-term nature of technological innovation, enterprises 
must adhere to the investment in technological innovation to gain something. The government's fiscal innovation 
investment ends up as a freely disposable fund of the company (Qiongqiong Zhou & Hua Qingsong, 2015) but some 
companies have not used a large amount of government investment only for technological innovation, resulting in a 
deviation of government-driven enterprises' innovative intentions. Thus, the government should implement segmental 
distribution, that is, maintain information with enterprises, understand the progress of research and development results, 
conduct in-depth analysis of the content of innovative projects, make a good decision on the allocation of subsidies, not 
give enterprises the opportunity to waste subsidies, and focus on the implementation of funds control to eliminate waste 
and misappropriation. 
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